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Abstract
The bulk of the literature that estimates the new Keynesian Phillips
curve, (NKPC), uses unit labor costs as a proxy to marginal cost. This
paper considers the contribution of non-labor unit costs to the latter.
The theory-based marginal cost is derived as a function of both labor
and non-labor unit costs, (including capital, net interest payments
and tax related costs). Using data on labor and non-labor payments
in nonfarm GDP for the US, we construct total unit costs as our proxy
for marginal cost. Total unit costs are shown to improve the ￿t of the
short-run variation in in￿ ation and strengthen the empirical support
for the role of expectations-based in￿ ation persistence and real mar-
ginal cost as the driving variable in the NKPC. They also imply a
duration of ￿xed nominal contracts that is closer to those suggested
by ￿rm-level surveys, than that implied by unit labor costs alone.
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Largely inspired by Gali and Gertler (1999), the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (NKPC) has emerged as a key feature of many dynamic macroeco-
nomic models and a key tool in monetary policy analysis. In spite of its
recent popularity however, there is still an ongoing debate as to whether the
NKPC can match the observed in￿ ation persistence and the length of ￿xed
nominal price contracts as implied by surveys at the micro level. Accumu-
lating empirical evidence on the performance of the NKPC suggests that in
explaining the dynamics of in￿ ation, (a) real marginal cost is a better driving
variable than the output gap, and (b) the hybrid NKPC, that includes lagged
in￿ ation, performs empirically better than the purely forward looking NKPC.
This has led to a wide adoption of the hybrid NKPC which speci￿es in￿ ation
as a function of lagged in￿ ation, expected future in￿ ation (one period ahead)
and real marginal cost as the driving variable (see eq. 1, Gali, Gertler and
Lopez-Salido 2005),
￿t = ￿b￿t￿1 + ￿fEt￿t+1 + ￿c mct + ￿t;
where ￿t is the in￿ ation rate, c mct is real marginal cost (as a percentage
deviation from its steady state value) and ￿t is a cost push shock. Gali and
Gertler (1999), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001, 2005) and Sbordone
(2002, 2005) suggest only a ￿modest￿role for intrinsic in￿ ation persistence
(￿b); whereas others ￿nd a very limited role for forward looking expected
in￿ ation (￿f) in the NKPC, (see Fuhrer 1997 Rudd and Whelan 2005, 2007,
LindØ 2005, Lawless and Whelan 2007 among others).1 A common feature
1In a recent study, Zhang, Osborn and Kim (2008) show that forward-looking behavior
played a small role during the higher in￿ ation volatility period 1968-1981 in the US,
suggesting that during periods of high in￿ ation volatility, in￿ ation persistence in the NKPC
may become more intrinsic.
3in these studies is that when the coe¢ cient of marginal costs (￿) becomes
more signi￿cant the NKPC tends to become more forward looking. This
is consistent with the theoretical concept that if in￿ ation dynamics are not
intrinsic to the model but driven largely by marginal costs, then expectations
about future prices should matter more.2
Following Gali and Gertler (1999), real marginal cost in the NKPC is
usually proxied by real unit labor costs, where the latter is measured in rela-
tion to the deviation of labor income share in the non-farm business sector
from its mean. Until recently, little attention has been placed on the exact
contribution of unit labor cost as a proxy to marginal costs. Fuhrer (2006)
shows that most of the persistence found in US in￿ ation data appears to be
intrinsic from the lagged in￿ ation term in the NKPC and thus cannot be
attributed to the conventional driving variable in these model, (i.e. the real
marginal cost proxied by unit labor costs).
The potential weakness of using unit labor costs as a proxy for marginal
cost is suggested by two observations in recent studies. First, the degree of
and the shifts in persistence using this proxy are not consistent with those
in in￿ ation (see Fuhrer 2006). Second, the estimated coe¢ cient of the real
marginal cost implies price rigidities that are not consistent with micro ev-
idence. The size of this coe¢ cient in the empirical literature for the US is
typically between 0.01 and 0.02, which assuming that the rate of discount
is between 0.9 and 1.0, implies that the degree of price stickiness ranges be-
tween 0.8 and 1; this implies a duration of price contracts of 6 quarters or
much longer. This is inconsistent with a number of ￿rm-level surveys which
suggest that price rigidity ranges between 1.5 to 4 quarters.3 These two ob-
2We discuss this further in section 2.
3See Blinder, Canetti, Lebow and Rudd (1998), Hall, Walsh and Yates (2000), Cheva-
lier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003), Bils and Klenow (2004), De Walque, Smets and Wouters
4servations suggest that labor unit costs may be a weak proxy to marginal
costs, (see Rudd and Whelan 2002, 2007, LindØ 2005). Rudd and Whelan
(2002) show that the labor share version of the NKPC explains a very small
proportion of the variation in in￿ ation. Lawless and Whelan (2007) use both
sectoral and aggregate data from 1979-2001 for all EU-15 countries and the
US. They test for both reduced form and structural speci￿cations of in￿ ation
and ￿nd negative coe¢ cients on the e⁄ect of the labor share on in￿ ation.4
They conclude that the NKPC joint prediction of in￿ ation and labor share
cannot explain the trends in the data, particularly at the sectoral level. Ear-
lier, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) provided evidence that labor income
share is a weak proxy for marginal cost in the US and suggest incorporating
labor adjustment costs in order to generate more procyclical marginal costs.
However, Sbordone (2005) shows that augmenting the marginal cost proxy,
by incorporating adjustment costs, does not signi￿cantly improve the ￿t of
the NKPC for US data.
Following Wolman (1999), who suggests that more re￿ned estimates of
marginal costs should be investigated, a recent strand in the literature ex-
amines whether alternative marginal cost proxies can improve the ￿t of the
NKPC.5 The bulk of this literature assumes di⁄erent production technologies
(2004), Gwin and VanHoose (2007), Coenen, Levin and Kai (2007) and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997).
4Lawless and Whelan (2007) also provide evidence that although there has been a
widespread decline in labor shares across a broad range of sectors, these declines have
not been associated with large shifts in in￿ ation, indicating that labor share may be an
incorrect proxy for marginal cost in estimating the NKPC.
5Some studies focus directly on re￿ning proxies for the output gap. For example, using
di⁄erent approaches, Chadha, and Nolan (2004), Neiss and Nelson (2005), and Bjłrnland,
Leitemo and Maih (2009) show that the use of theory consistent output gaps can be as
good a proxy as real marginal cost. They suggest that the output gap proxies may not
perform as well because output trends, that are largely used in the literature, are poor
approximations to the output gap.
5and aggregation methods and express average marginal cost as a function of
both labor unit costs and the output (or employment) gap (Sbordone 2002,
2005, Gagnon and Khan 2005, Matheron and Maury 2004).6 This literature
concludes that assumptions about the nature of the production technology
and aggregation factors may improve the ￿t of the NKPC, though this is sub-
ject to the production technology parameters assumed. More recently, Gwin
and VanHoose (2007, 2008) examine alternative measures of marginal cost
and prices in estimating the NKPC. 7 The key contribution in their papers
comes from the use of a PPI-in￿ ation measure, which is shown to produce
signi￿cantly di⁄erent results to those implied by Gali and Gertler. However,
in using their alternative marginal cost data to replicate the tests by Gali
and Gertler (1999), they too conclude that their estimates do not di⁄er from
what has already been shown in the literature (Gwin and VanHoose 2008).
Building on these recent ￿ndings, this paper shows that the inclusion
of non-labor unit costs in the marginal cost proxy helps improve the ￿t of
the short-run variation in in￿ ation. We show that the theory-consistent real
marginal cost implies that not only changes in labor unit costs but also in
non-labor costs, such as capital unit costs, (accounting for capital utilization
and depreciation), net ￿nance costs (i.e. net interest payments related to
the ￿rm￿ s borrowing costs and ￿nancial assets) and production taxes, can
determine the variation in the in￿ ation-output trade o⁄. Available aggregate
6These studies assume that capital does not change with respect to changes in the
relative price of ￿rms, hence the resulting real marginal cost is still largely driven by labor
unit costs, as assumed in Gali and Gertler (1999).
7They develop a measure of average variable costs using Standard & Poor￿ s Compustat
database for publicly traded U.S. companies.This comprises ￿nancial data from quarterly
and annual Securities and Exchange Commission ￿lings by over 10,000 ￿rms. From this
database they obtain individual ￿rm revenues and costs of goods sold for the period
1966:1-2004:4 and construct a PPI and a growth rate of average variable costs as proxies
to average price and marginal costs, respectively.
6data that closely match our description of non-labor costs appear to be the
non-labor payments in nonfarm GDP as published by the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) and the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Proportionally, non-labor payments are much smaller than labor
payments, however, as ￿gure 1 shows the variation in non-labor payments
is substantially large, suggesting that this component may be an important
source of variation in marginal costs in the short run.8
{Figure 1. 12-mth Change in Proxies for Real Marginal Cost}
Using the above data we construct our real marginal cost proxy, total unit
costs, as the sum of the shares of labor unit costs and non-labor unit costs
of all nonfarm business sector in nonfarm GDP, de￿ ated by the non-farm
de￿ ator.9 We show that the addition of non-labor unit costs to the widely
used unit labor costs, improves on the existing empirical support for the role
of real marginal cost as the driving variable in the NKPC. In particular, by
replicating the methodology of Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali, Gertler
and Lopez-Salido (2005), using non-linear GMM estimates on US data for
the sample period 1966:Q1 to 2003:Q4, we ￿nd that whereas real unit labor
costs, as a proxy to marginal cost, produce a coe¢ cient of around 0:02, for
the same sample period and methodology the equivalent coe¢ cient for total
unit costs is around 0:05 or higher. The use of total units costs as a marginal
cost proxy is also shown to increase the importance of the forward looking or
expectations-based in￿ ation persistence ￿f; this e⁄ect is stronger in periods
8See also ￿gures 1a and 1b below
9Given the homogeneity in the data source, (US, BLS) we see this as the most natural
extension to the already familiar unit labor costs employed widely in the literature. Further
details on the de￿nition and construction of total unit costs are given in the empirical
section below.
7of relatively higher in￿ ation volatility, rather than in the more recent years
of in￿ ation stability. Our results also suggest that total unit costs imply a
duration of ￿xed nominal contracts of around 4 quarters or less, which is
much closer to the ￿rm-level surveys based on micro data (1.5 to 4 quarters),
than that implied purely by labor unit costs, (i.e. around 5-6 quarters or
higher).
The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the
theoretical model which consists of households, a credit market, wholesale
and intermediate ￿rms and a monetary authority; from the former sectors
we derive the NKPC where non-labor costs are shown to enter the de￿nition
of marginal cost. Section 3 discusses the data followed by estimates of the
NKPC and fundamental in￿ ation. Section 4 concludes and discusses the
implications of the main results.
2 The Model
We consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model describing an
economy that consists of households, wholesale and intermediate ￿rms, a
credit market and a central bank. Households own capital and provide their
labor and capital rental services to ￿rms. Wholesale ￿rms use intermediate
goods to produce a ￿nal good that is traded competitively. Intermediate
￿rms compete monopolistically; they determine the demand for labor and
capital and set prices, but they need to borrow from the credit market to
cover their variable costs (wages and rental cost of capital). Firms also hold
some safe assets for collateral purposes. The credit market receives deposits
from households and provides loans to ￿rms. Given the loan rate determined
by banks, ￿rms decide on the demand for loans whereas the supply of loans
8is determined elastically at the loan rate; we assume that the credit market
makes normal pro￿ts which together with the pro￿ts of ￿rms are distributed
back to households.
2.1 Households
Households are represented by a typical agent who provides a homogenous
labor service, n, to all producing ￿rms, derives utility from holding cash, Mt,
for transactions purposes and consumes a basket of all produced goods, ct.

























where ￿ < 1 is the subjective discount factor; ￿;￿m; ￿n are elasticities;
￿ = 1=￿ is the marginal disutility of labor and ￿ the labor supply elasticity.
Households nominal income consists of, cash endowments Mt￿1; gross interest
payments on deposits from the previous period, Dt￿1, where RD
t = (1 + iD
t )
and iD
t is the nominal deposit rate; wage income, PtwtNt, where wt is the real
wage rate; capital rental income, rtutkt, from letting their capital to ￿rms,
where rt is the real rental price of capital, kt, and ut is capital utilization;
and ￿nally, end of period (net of production tax) pro￿ts from all ￿rms and
the commercial bank, Vt =
R
Vj;t +V b
t , plus lump nominal sum transfers Pt￿t.
The household￿ s budget constraint is,
Pt(ct + it) + Mt + Dt (2)
= Pt(wtnt + rtutkt) + Mt￿1 + R
D
t￿1Dt￿1 + Vt + Pt￿t
10Throughout the paper small latin letters, x, indicate real variables of X, (apart from
the nominal interest rates, iX) whereas b x denotes the log-linearised value of x as a deviation
from its steady state.
9We assume that investment, it, is related to the capital stock as follows,



















kt ￿ 1)2 are quadratic costs related to capital investment; ’ is the elas-
ticity of marginal depreciation cost and so given ￿
0
(￿) > 0, more capital
utilization and higher values of ’ increases the rate of depreciation and thus
capital consumption, (see Neiss and Pappa 2005).
Assuming no Ponzi-game conditions for all assets, and denoting the La-


























































Equation (4) and (5) determine the marginal utility of consumption and Euler
equation, while equations (6)-(9) de￿ne the optimal allocations of labor, real
balances and capital.
102.2 The Credit Market
The credit market is represented by a typical commercial bank, b. The bank
accepts deposits from households, Dt, at the rate iD
t , and makes loans, Lt,
to ￿rms at the loan rate iL
t . The demand for loans is determined by ￿rms
whereas the bank sets the interest rate on loans. If the credit market is
short of liquidity, it can borrow from the central bank, LCB
t at the re￿nance
(policy) rate, iCB
t . We assume that banks do not have to meet a reserve
requirement ratio. The commercial bank￿ s balance sheet is
Lt = Dt + L
CB
t (10)
We assume that in their conduct of intermediation commercial banks also in-
cur some costs, ￿t(￿t;yt); these are increasing in costs related to credit market
imperfections (￿t), but decreasing with aggregate economic activity and will-
ingness of banks to lend. In particular, we assume that ￿t(￿t;yt) = ￿t +y
￿￿
t ,
where ￿ > 0, and ￿t evolves as follows, log(￿t) = ￿￿ log(￿)+(1￿￿￿)log(￿t￿1)+
￿￿;t. Thus at the steady state ￿ = log(￿) = ￿ > 0, which captures the
mark-up over the policy rate due to market structure imperfections in the
credit market, whereas ￿￿;t captures innovations to such costs, (for a similar
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t ￿ ￿t(￿t;yt)Lt (11)










t + ￿t + y
￿￿
t ; (12)
11As shown below, this assumption also ensures that loan spreads are countercyclical,
as supported by empirical evidence. For a paper where such a relationship is explained
endogenously see AgØnor, Bratsiotis and Pfajfar, (2011).
11hence with a zero requirement reserve ratio the deposit rate is equal to the
re￿nance rate whereas the loan rate is a mark-up over the re￿nance rate
driven by intermediation costs.
2.3 Wholesale and Intermediate Firms
There is a continuum of imperfectly competitive ￿rms, j 2 [0;1], each engag-
ing in the production of a di⁄erentiated good, yj;t, which sells at the price







, by minimizing the cost, Ptyt =
R 1
0 Pj;tyj;tdj.
















The production of each intermediate good combines capital and labor ac-







￿ ; 0 < ￿k, ￿n < 1 are the corresponding input shares and at
measures labor productivity. If ￿ = 0; equation (15) reduces to a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function. The reason for deviating here from the
widely used (in this literature) Cobb-Douglas production function, is that
the latter assumes a unity elasticity of output with respect to labor and as a
result the marginal cost is proportional to the labor share, (see Rotemberg
and Woodford, 1999). The use of a CES production function allows the
12marginal product of labor and hence marginal cost to be a⁄ected by varying
input shares hence this speci￿cation is more appropriate for the purpose of
this paper. Note, for simplicity, we assume that employment and capital is
common to all ￿rms, which simpli￿es aggregation while still allowing for the
average and marginal products to vary, (see Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido,
2007, Cantore Levine and Yang, 2010).12
In each period intermediate ￿rms must borrow to cover their variable
input costs (capital and labor), but they are required by lenders to hold some
risk-free ￿nancial assets for risk diversi￿cation and collateral purposes. In
this paper the latter assumption serves mainly to capture the fact that many
￿rms tend to hold safe assets in their ￿nancial portfolio (i.e. for risk hedging,
pension plans etc.). This implies that in addition to the borrowing costs,
￿rms also have a source of ￿nancial returns, which here we need in order to
capture the item "net interest and miscellaneous payments" in the additional
non-labor payments data used for constructing our total unit cost de￿nition
of marginal cost below.13 For simplicity we assume that all risk-free assets
held by each ￿rm are summarized in the form of government bonds, Bj;t.14
Hence, the existing stock of all government bonds satis￿es, Bt =
R 1
0 Bj;tdj.15
12Note that assuming ￿rm speci￿c factor inputs within a CES production technology,
implies further relative price and in￿ ation e⁄ects as the marginal products of labor and
capital are aslo a⁄ected by the relative price and market power of the ￿rm. Gagnon and
Khan (2005) examine such e⁄ects in a model of labor input and ￿xed capital.
13For the exact data de￿nitions see in the Appendix.
14Note that issues of risk and probability of default are not essential for the purpose
of this paper; for recent papers that deal with idiosyncratic risk see Faia and Monacelli
(2007) and AgØnor, Bratsiotis, and Pfajfar, (2011).
15Note that households and commercial banks could also hold government bonds, but
for the purpose of this paper we focus on bonds being held only by ￿rms. Within our
framework this can be explained by the fact that bonds and deposits bear the same interest,
hence the household treats them as very close substitutes. Similarly, given the two assets
have the same return, (and given that commercial banks banks do not bear risk in this
model), banks would rather use all deposits for loans rather than hold bonds. This however
is not true for ￿rms which by assumption are required by banks to back part of their loans
13Firms contract labor and capital at their market determined real wage and
real rental price of capital, hence the ￿rm￿ s loan is equivalent to its variable
cost,
Lt = Ptrtkt + Ptwtnt; (16)
We assume that a portion # of loans is collateralized by the ￿rm￿ s holdings
of safe assets (before interest payments),16
#Lt = Bj;t (17)
From (15), 16 and (17), the ￿rm￿ s period pro￿ts are,
Vj;t = Pj;tyj;t(1 ￿ ￿
Y
t ) + i
CB




t is a net (i.e. less subsidies or business transfers) production tax,
and RL
t = 1 + iL
t . Using (13)-(18), the period optimal real price of ￿rm j is,
P
￿
j;t=Pt = ￿pmct (19)





















t (yt=kt)1￿￿ is the marginal product of capital and ￿na
￿
t (yt=nt)1￿￿
is the marginal product of labor. With a Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation, (i.e.
with ￿ = 0), and with only labor costs, (where ￿n = 1 ￿ ￿), (20) reduces
to mct = wt
(1￿￿)(yt=nt); which is the widely used marginal cost proxy, known
by collateral, i.e. bonds here.
16In Goodfriend and McCallum, (2007), loan makers construct collateral from goveren-
ment bonds and ￿rms￿capital; Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Vegh, (2008) show borrowing ￿rms
to have government bonds explicitly in their ￿ ow constraint.
17Note that here marginal cost incudes also the production tax.
14as the share of unit labor costs in GDP, (Gali, Gertler and Salido-Lopez
2001, 2005, Gali and Gertler 1999). However, from (20), real marginal cost
here is a function of both unit labor costs and non-labor unit costs, the sum
of which we de￿ne as total unit cost in this paper. Unit labor costs is the
familiar proxy as identi￿ed elsewhere in the literature, whereas non-labor unit
costs, (in combination with (4)-(9) and (12)), are a function of, real capital
costs, (accounting for capital consumption and depreciation); net interest
payments that relate to the ￿rm￿ s borrowing costs and ￿nancial returns;
intermediations costs; and ￿nally net production taxes.18
2.4 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
We allow nominal rigidity to be characterized by a Calvo type price setting,
according to which the price of each ￿rm has a ￿xed probability,  , of re-
maining ￿xed at the previous period￿ s price and a ￿xed probability of 1 ￿  
of being adjusted. Each ￿rm setting a new price at time t will choose a
price contract, Xt, to minimize current and future deviations of prices from

















t , is the discount factor. Minimizing (21) with
respect to Pj;t and denoting percentage deviations around a zero in￿ ation
18Note that (20) is consistent with a some papers in the literature that derive marginal
costs as a function of labor costs as well as capital costs, borrowing costs and productions
taxes, or combinations of these (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001, Woodford,
M. 2001, Ravenna and Walsh 2006, Chowdhury, Ho⁄mann, and Schabert, 2006, Faia and
Monacelli 2007, Di Bartolomeo, and Manzo, 2007, Agenor, Bratsiotis and Pfajfar 2011).
15steady state by a hat, we obtain,








= (1 ￿  ￿)(b P
￿
j;t) +  ￿Et b Xt+s;
where b Xt is the optimal price contract chosen by all ￿rms that adjust prices
in each period t and b P ￿
j;t = b Pt + c mct is the optimal price based on (19),
approximated around a zero in￿ ation steady state. The average price in the
economy is,
b Pt =   b Pt￿1 + (1 ￿  )b P
N
t ; (23)
where newly set prices, b P N
t = (1 ￿ !) b Xt + ! b P B
t , are a weighted average of
optimally set prices, b Xt and backward looking set price, b P B
t = b Xt￿1+￿t￿1, (as
in Gali and Gertler, 1999). Using equations (22) and (23) and the de￿nitions,
￿t = b Pt ￿ b Pt￿1, ￿t￿1 = b Pt￿1 ￿ b Pt￿2 and Et￿t+1 = Et(b Pt+1 ￿ b Pt) we derive the
hybrid NKPC.
￿t = ￿b￿t￿1 + ￿fEt￿t+1 + ￿c mct; (24)
where, ￿b = !
 +!(1￿ (1￿￿)); ￿f =
 ￿
 +!(1￿ (1￿￿)); ￿ =
(1￿!)(1￿ )(1￿ ￿)
 +!(1￿ (1￿￿)) ; and the
log-linearized marginal cost, or total unit costs, is19
c mct =
iL^ {L
t ￿ #iCB^ {CB
t
1 + iL ￿ #iCB +








where, b Sk;t = ^ rt￿(1￿￿)(b yt￿^ kt)￿￿^ ut and b Sn;t = ^ wt￿(1￿￿)(^ yt￿^ nt)￿￿b at,
are the shares of capital unit costs and labor unit costs respectively and
Sk = rk
￿k(y=k)(1￿￿) and Sn = w
￿n(y=n)(1￿￿), are their respective steady states.
19For the log-linearization of the marginal cost see Appendix B.














t is described in (25) below and b ￿t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)b ￿t￿1 + ￿￿;t:
From the coe¢ cients ￿b, ￿f, and ￿, (24) implies that for any given proba-
bility of ￿rms not adjusting prices ( ), a smaller weight on backward looking
in￿ ation (!) reduces the coe¢ cient on past in￿ ation (￿b), while increasing
the coe¢ cient on marginal costs (￿) and future expected in￿ ation (￿f); in
which case the role of real marginal cost, as opposed to that of intrinsic in-
￿ ation, should also become more signi￿cant in driving in￿ ation dynamics in
the model. Note that (24) is similar to the hybrid NKPC derived in Gali
and Gertler (1999) and Gali, Gertler and Salido-Lopez (2001, 2005), with
the main di⁄erence being the composition of the real marginal cost; in the
latter two studies, as with the bulk of the literature, marginal cost is proxied
simply by unit labor costs, c mct = b Sn;t = ^ wt ￿ (^ yt ￿ ^ nt).
2.5 Monetary Policy and Macro Equilibrium
We complete the theoretical model by assuming that monetary policy is




t = ￿ib i
CB
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
￿￿￿t + ￿yb yt
￿
+ ￿i;t (25)
where, 0 < ￿i < 1 and ￿￿;￿￿ > 0 and ￿i;t follows an AR(1) process. We as-
sume that any liquidity o⁄ered by central banks as loans to the commercial
20At the steady state, iCB = ￿
￿1; iL = iCB +￿, (￿ > 0), and also a = u = 1; (see Neiss
and Pappa, 2005).
17bank enters through exogenous cash injections, (i.e. LCB
t = Mt ￿ Mt￿1).21
We also assume that at the end of each period, any proceeds from produc-
tion taxes, or from the central bank￿ s cash loans to the commercial bank,
are transferred to households through a lump sum transfer, Pt￿t. Hence
equilibrium in the ￿nal goods markets must satisfy the aggregate resource
constraint, yt = ct + it.
3 Empirical Estimation
In this section we replicate some of the key tests performed in the literature
to show that, as indicated by the theoretical model, total unit costs is a
more appropriate proxy for marginal cost than unit labor costs. We show
that although unit-labor costs is the largest component of marginal cost, the
addition of non-labor costs to the conventional labor unit costs adds more
information to the data and improves the ￿t of in￿ ation persistence and the
proxy for real marginal cost as the driving variable in the NKPC.
3.1 Data
Our choice of data and its source remains as consistent as possible to the
data already used in the literature. Total unit costs are constructed using
quarterly data for labor costs and non-labor costs for the period 1966:Q1 to
2003:Q4, available from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the
U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis.22 Of these, la-
21This, in conjuction with the bank￿ s balance sheet (equations 8 and 9), also de￿ne the
demand for deposits, (see also Ravenna and Walsh, 2006).
22This sample period corresponds to Fuhrer (2006) as we want to compare our results
with those produced by Fuhrer￿ s ACF graph, (see Figure 4 below). Also, it is important
here to emphasize that our total unit costs is constructed from all non-farm business sector
(using raw BLS data), rather than merely on the non-￿nancial corporate sector. The data
18bor costs are the same data as that used widely in the literature.23 Non-labor
costs, are based on non-labor payments (non-farm) as published by the BLS,
less corporate pro￿ts (non-farm). Thus, consistent with our theoretical spec-
i￿cation non-labor costs consist of, consumption of ￿xed capital, net taxes on
production (and imports), net interest and miscellaneous payments (includ-
ing borrowing costs and interest earnings on ￿nancial assets) and business
current transfer payments.24 Our proxy for real marginal cost, real total unit
costs, is then constructed as the (log of) the sum of labor costs and non-labor
costs in non-farm GDP, de￿ ated by the (log of) non-farm de￿ ator.25 As with
the rest of the literature, marginal cost is measured as a deviation from its
mean, that is also consistent with the log-linearized theoretical model.
{Figure 2a} {Figure 2b}
Figures 2a and 2b compare annual in￿ ation with the annual change in (non-
farm) unit labor cost and (non-farm) total unit costs, respectively. Evidently,
both unit labor costs and unit total costs track in￿ ation, however the variance
set we use is also clearly di⁄erent to that used in Gwin and VanHoose (2007, 2008) that
is constructed based on around 10,000 listed ￿rms in S&P, that is part of the six-digit
NAICS industry classi￿cations system.
23For more details see in the Appendix.
24As shown from (20) and (24) our theoretical marginal cost captures most of the key
components of the de￿nition of the non-labor payments as given by the BLS, except import
taxes. Had we assumed that part of the intermediate goods were imported, the marginal
costs would also be a function of imported goods and hence import taxes. For comparative
reasons, but also to keep our paper consistent with the bulk of the theoretical literature, we
choose not to explore related theoretical issues of an open economy, although we recognize
the importance of the latter. For a recent paper that considers open economy issues within
a new Keynesian framework, see Adolfson, LasØen, LindØ, and Villani, (2005).
25Note that as indicated by a number of studies, the results do not di⁄er much when
the all-sector GDP de￿ ator is used instead of the non-farm GDP de￿ ator (see Gali and
Gertler 1999, Fuhrer 2006). Also, the use of the GDP de￿ ator, as opposed to the PPI as
suggested by Gwin and VanHoose (2007, 2008), is mainly for transparency in assessing
the signi￿cance of our marginal cost proxy in relation to the conventional estimations of
the NKPC.
19of unit total costs around in￿ ation appears to be smaller than that of unit
labor costs.26
Figures 3a-3d present, as a crude measure of persistence, the sample au-
tocorrelations of the total unit cost and unit labor cost measures of marginal
cost and in￿ ation. For completeness, we also show the autocorrelation for
non-labor unit costs, the additional component of total unit costs. Figure 3a
shows that the persistence in in￿ ation is much greater than the persistence of
unit labor costs. After the ￿rst four periods the autocorrelation in unit labor
costs drops substantially in relation to that of actual in￿ ation, whereas the
opposite is shown for the persistence of the non-unit labor costs. As a result
the combination of these two, that is the persistence in total unit costs, is
shown to be much closer to the persistence in actual in￿ ation.
{Figure 3a} {Figure 3b}
{Figure 3c} {Figure 3d}
Empirical evidence suggests that most notable shifts in in￿ ation persistence
in the US occurred in the early 1980s and in the 1990s. Accordingly, in ￿gures
3b to 3d we plot the sample autocorrelations of the two alternative marginal
cost proxies, for the sub-samples 1980-2003 and 1990-2003. Only non-labor
unit cost and total unit cost show any perceptible shift in persistence across
the samples.27The estimated sum of the lag coe¢ cients in a univariate au-
toregression over the full sample for unit labor cost, non-labor unit cost and
total unit costs are 0.90, 0.97 and 0.95, respectively. However it is known
26Note the di⁄erences in the height of the peaks of total unit costs (which is about 0.02
for the ￿rst shock and 0.01 at the second shock) re￿ ect the response of non-labor costs to
the oil price shock.
27A graph similar to ￿g 3b in our paper is in Fuhrer 2006, (page 74), that accounts only
for unit labor cost.
20that in the presence of shifts in persistence these estimates could be biased.
{Table 1: Test for Break Points in the Persistence of...}
Table 1 presents the results of a more formal estimation of persistence
in the presence of unknown breaks (as suggested by Perron and Vogelsang
1992). Table 1 shows the break points and the coe¢ cients on the AR term for
each resulting sub-sample. The changes in the size of the AR coe¢ cients are
relatively small for unit labor costs thus con￿rming the previous inference of
very little change in persistence. The average of the AR coe¢ cients for non-
unit labor costs and total unit costs are higher than the average for unit labor
cost even after we account for the breaks. However, as Rotemberg (2007)
demonstrates, the NKPC can generate in￿ ation that is more persistent than
the driving variable. Hence, one cannot rely on the univariate estimates
of persistence in assessing alternative measures of marginal cost. In what
follows therefore we turn to examine the structural estimates of the NKPC.
3.2 Structural Estimates
In this section we estimate the hybrid NKPC, equation (24), using non-linear
instrumental variables (GMM) with robust errors over the period 1966:Q1
to 2003:Q4. To deal with the small sample normalization problem we follow
Gali and Gertler (1999) and use the following orthogonality conditions,
Et￿1f(￿t ￿ ￿c mct ￿ ￿f￿t+1 ￿ ￿b￿t￿1)zt￿1g = 0 (26)
Et￿1f(￿￿t￿(1￿!)(1￿ )(1￿ ￿)c mct￿ ￿￿t+1￿!￿
￿1￿t￿1)zt￿1g = 0 (27)
where ￿ =   + !(1 ￿  (1 ￿ ￿)), zt￿1 is a vector of variables dated t-1 and
earlier and equation (24) is assumed to include an error term "t that is i.i.d.
21Equation (26) normalizes the coe¢ cient on in￿ ation to be unity whereas (27)
does not.
{Table 2: NKPC Estimates: Unit Labor Cost vs Total Unit Costs}
Table 2 gives non-linear instrumental variables, (GMM, IV) estimates of the
deep structural parameters in equation (24) using labor unit costs and total
unit costs as proxies for marginal cost, respectively. The instrument set used
is four lags of the measure of real marginal costs, in￿ ation, wage in￿ ation
and commodity price in￿ ation.28 The results in Table 2, suggest that adding
non-labor unit costs to the familiar unit labor costs improves on the existing
empirical support for (a) the role of real marginal cost as the driving variable
in the NKPC and (b) the forward looking expectations-based new Keynesian
Phillips curve.
Focusing ￿rst on the real marginal cost coe¢ cient, ￿, Table 2 shows that
total unit costs imply a higher ￿, than the traditional measure of real unit
labor cost. Further, t-statistics for the di⁄erence in these estimated coe¢ -
cients, show that even when standard errors are taken into account the size
of ￿ is signi￿cantly di⁄erent (higher in absolute terms) when total unit cost
is used as the measure of marginal cost, irrespective of the orthogonality
condition and restriction on beta.29
To further establish, independently of our structural model, whether the
total unit costs NKPC is a better speci￿cation than the unit labor costs
28Here we use the most parsimonious instrument set possible to avoid the estimation
bias that arise in small samples with too many over-identifying restrictions (see Staiger
and Stock (1987). However, in Table 3, where we compare our marginal cost proxy to that
used in Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005) we use, for comparative purposes, exactly
the same instruments as those employed by the latter study.
29Table 2a in the Appendix, reports the t-statistics for the di⁄erence in the estimated
parameters in Table 2 using the standard test for di⁄erence in means. (see Appendix).
22NKPC, we also conduct a non-nested test. The results are summarized in
Table 3. Although the de￿nition of total unit cost nests unit labor cost,
equation (24) does not lend itself to the traditional F-tests for nested models,
since it only includes one marginal cost variable. We therefore treat the unit
labor cost NKPC and total unit labor cost NKPC as two di⁄erent non-nested
models focusing on the choice of regressors, that is total unit cost versus unit
labor cost. In this regard we employ the Davidson and MacKinnon (1981)
J-test which is based on the comprehensive approach and the Godfrey (1983)
non-nested test for instrumental variable estimators.30
{Table 3: NKPC Estimates: Non-nested Tests}
Table 3, indicates that while we reject the null hypothesis for the labor unit
cost NKPC model in favour of the total unit cost model, we cannot reject
the null for the total unit cost NKPC model; hence total unit cost NKPC
appears to be a better explanatory variable for in￿ ation than the standard
labor unit cost NKPC.
3.2.1 Total Unit Costs and Forward Looking Behavior
The results in Table 2 also suggest that when total unit costs are used as
the driving variable in the NKPC, the coe¢ cients on the structural parame-
ters indicating backward looking behavior, (i.e. !;  and ￿b) are generally
lower, and those indicating forward looking behavior (i.e. ￿f and ￿) are
generally higher, than their respective labor unit cost counterparts. To test
the robustness of this result we perform a number of tests, including try-
ing di⁄erent sample periods, applying a time varying trend and also testing
30For more details see in the Appendix
23the implications of total unit costs for fundamental in￿ ation and in￿ ation
persistence.31
First, we test whether the relatively stronger forward looking behavior
implied by total unit costs, holds in periods of high in￿ ation volatility. Us-
ing unit labor costs on US data, Zhang, Osborn and Kim (2008) ￿nd very
little empirical support for the role of forward expectations-based in￿ ation
persistence in the high and volatile in￿ ation period 1968:1 to 1981:4. When
we estimate the NKPC structural parameters for the same sample period,
we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on unit labor costs is, ￿ = 0:024 (0:001) (stan-
dard errors in brackets) with ￿b = 0:339 (0:016) and ￿f = 0:478 (0:020).32
However, for the same sample period the use of total unit costs produces,
￿ = 0:0407 (0:0016), with ￿b = 0:299 (0:015) and ￿f = 0:570 (0:024).33 This,
consistently with Table 2, suggests that total unit costs indicate a larger role
for forward looking behavior than that implied by unit labor costs. It also
suggests, that much of the evidence supporting a backward NKPC might
have been somewhat biased by the use of unit labor costs as a proxy for
marginal cost.
Similar results are presented in Table 4, where we examine the role of total
unit costs using the exact sample period and instruments used by Gali,Gertler
and Salido-Lopez (2005) (GGSL 2005),
{Table 4: Comparative estimates of NKPC with GGSL 2005}
Total unit costs are again shown to produce a statistically signi￿cant co-
e¢ cient that is larger than that produced by unit labor costs. Note also
31The latter two tests are discussed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.3 respectively.
32For the full details see Table 6 in the Appendix.
33The di⁄erence in the coe¢ cients on ￿f between these two marginal cost proxies is
statistically signi￿cant (t-stat for di⁄erence is 22:037).
24that in relation to Table 2, that includes the more recent years of relatively
high in￿ ation stability (late 1980s to 2003), Table 4 suggests a larger role of
expectations-based in￿ ation persistence, ￿f, when total unit costs are used
instead of labor unit costs.
We also ￿nd that total unit costs imply a degree of price stickiness,  ,
that is closer to the values supported by micro data. Speci￿cally, the estimate
from the ￿rst orthogonality condition implies an average price duration of 3.6
quarters, while the second orthogonality condition implies a duration of 4.1
quarters. Even after we account for the standard errors, these estimates are
closer to the 3 to 4 quarters found by Blinder (1994) using micro data, than
a duration of 5 quarters or higher which is typically found in the empirical
NKPC literature.34
{Table 5: NKPC, GMM Estimates - detrended unit cost}
Consistently with the literature, the above estimations are based on devi-
ations of unit labor costs and total unit cost from their respective sample
mean. However, this may not be appropriate if there are changes in the
mean over time, which as ￿gures 1, 2 and 3 suggest, is likely. In this regard,
similar to Gwin and VanHoose (2007) we use the HP detrended measures of
marginal cost along with the same instrument set. Table 5 indicates that the
results do not change signi￿cantly for total unit costs. We next check the
implications of total unit costs for fundamental in￿ ation and persistence.
34Note that Sbordone￿ s (2001) main baseline calibrated results (using labor unit costs)
show price contracts of 4.7 quarters. To obtain plausible estimates for price stickiness
she had to assume (a) the share of capital was 0.25 , (b) the mark-up ￿rms charged was
20%. The latter assumption is signi￿cantly higher than the 10% found in the literature see
Gagnon and Khan (2004) and Basu and Fernald (1997). Also Gagnon and Khan￿ s (2004),
(also using unit labor costs), estimates of beta (0.86 is the largest value reported) are very
low with respect to near unity as suggested for the US in Gali and Gertler (1999).
253.2.2 Actual versus Fundamental In￿ ation
To assess the explanatory power of the NKPC using total unit cost as opposed
to unit labor costs, we estimate the model-consistent or ￿ fundamental￿(Gali
and Gertler 1999) in￿ ation rate and compare this with the actual in￿ ation
rate. As Gali and Gertler (1999) show, the hybrid NKPC has the following
closed form,
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1+p
1￿4￿b￿f
2￿f are the small and large roots
of (24) respectively and zt is a subset of the market￿ s information set con-
taining current and lagged values of in￿ ation and real marginal cost i.e.
zt = f￿t;:::;￿t￿q+1; c mct;:::; c mct￿q+1g0. If we assume that the data generat-
ing process for zt can be represented by the following VAR(q), zt = Azt￿1+
vt, where A is a 2q x 2q companion matrix, then as Campbell and Shiller














from which the fundamental in￿ ation is,
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where h0 is a 1 x 2q selection row vector that extracts the forecast of real
marginal cost (i.e. the ￿rst element of A(1 ￿ ￿2A)￿1zt). Accordingly, we
derive the present value of future marginal cost from a VAR(3) model.35
35The Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria suggest a lag length of 3 for the
VARs for both total unit cost and unit labor cost.
26The resulting fundamental in￿ ation for total unit cost and unit labor cost
versus actual in￿ ation are shown in ￿gures 4a and 4b.
{Figure 4a} {Figure 4b}
These ￿gures show that the total unit cost driven NKPC matches actual
in￿ ation much better than its unit labor cost counterpart. 36
3.3 Total Unit Costs and In￿ ation Persistence
In this section we examine how the in￿ ation persistence implied by our total
unit cost driven NKPC, that is based on the structural parameters of our
model, compares to that implied by a VAR model using real data. Following
Fuhrer (2006), we compute the theoretical autocorrelation function (ACF)
for the NKPC using the coe¢ cients from Table 2 (as implied by the orthog-
onality condition (27) for the unrestricted case ) and then compare it to the
autocorrelation function from the simple three variable VAR in the in￿ ation
rate, federal funds rate and real marginal cost, estimated over the period
1966 to 2003.37 The ACF of the VAR gives an estimate of the persistence
that is consistent with the data and is independent of any structural or theo-
retical restriction. Fuhrer (2006) suggests that the reduced-form persistence
obtained from the VAR serves as a useful benchmark. By comparing this
reduced-form persistence with that implied by the pure NKPC model we can
36Moreover, the generalized R2 of Pesaran and Smith (1994), which is an asymptoti-
cally valid model selection criterion and measure of ￿t for nested and non-nested models
estimated with instrumental variables, are 0.899 for the total unit cost NKPC and 0.706
for unit labor cost NKPC.
37We are grateful to Je⁄ Fuhrer for sharing his programs for generating the ACFs and
con￿dence bands for the NKPC and VAR. For a detailed derivation of the ACF for in￿ ation
see Fuhrer (2006).
27assess whether the persistence in in￿ ation emanates from the driving variable
or whether it is intrinsic.
Fuhrer (2006) shows that since the coe¢ cient on the real marginal cost (as
implied by unit labor costs) is at most around 0.035, for the theoretical NKPC
to lie within the 75% con￿dence the coe¢ cient on the backward looking
in￿ ation needs to have a value of 0.6, which contradicts the suggested values
in the Gali et al studies, (which is around 0.3).
However, when we use Fuhrer￿ s ACF graph with total unit costs as the
marginal cost proxy, the theoretical NKPC lies well within the 70% con￿-
dence. In particular, using the coe¢ cient estimates in Table 2, ￿gure 5 shows
the graph of the theoretical ACF implied by the total unit cost driven NKPC,
(TUC NKPC - solid line). This ￿gure also shows the ACF graph as implied
by the unit labor cost driven NKPC, (Fuhrer (2006) - dashed line), as well
as the ACF and the corresponding con￿dence interval implied by the VAR
(VAR ￿dotted line).38
{Figure 5}
In contrast to the ACF derived from the unit labor cost model (Fuhrer
2006), the ACF derived from the total unit cost driven NKPC is much closer
to the benchmark VAR ACF, and although at points is slightly higher, it
is still within the 70% con￿dence band corresponding to Fuhrer (2006). In
general, the total unit cost driven NKPC generates persistence that matches
the data reasonably well. This also means that a lower ￿b is now required to
capture the observed persistence in in￿ ation, as a larger part of in￿ ation is
now captured by the real marginal cost proxy. In particular, the estimated
value of ￿b = 0:245, that we use to derive the theoretical ACF in Figure 5, is
much lower than the value of ￿b = 0:6 that Fuhrer (2006) found was required
38The shaded area gives the 70% con￿dence interval for the ACF from the VAR.
28for the NKPC to su¢ ciently capture the persistence in in￿ ation under unit
labor costs.
4 Concluding Remarks
Wolman (1999), suggests that in assessing the new Keynesian Phillips curve
more re￿ned estimates of marginal cost than the labor income share should
be investigated. Extending the data already used in the literature, by using
both labor and non-labor payments in nonfarm GDP so as to match our
theory-based marginal cost, we construct a total unit cost that we use as our
real marginal cost proxy in the new Keynesian Phillips curve.
It is shown that adding non-labor unit costs to the familiar labor unit
costs, (i) improves on the ￿t of observed in￿ ation and hence on the exist-
ing empirical support for real marginal costs as the driving variable in the
NKPC; (ii) imply a duration of ￿xed nominal contracts that is much closer to
those suggested by ￿rm-level surveys, than that implied by merely labor unit
costs; (iii) total unit costs suggest a larger role for forward looking behavior
and expectations-based in￿ ation persistence than that implied by the con-
ventional unit labor costs. This e⁄ect is shown to hold even in the relatively
high and volatile in￿ ation periods of the 1970￿ s where the use of unit labor
costs suggest a very weak forward looking behavior. Intuitively, this might
be because in periods of increased uncertainty and high in￿ ation volatility,
expectations about future in￿ ation may be more relevant to ￿rms￿decisions
about non-labor costs, such as on borrowing costs and investment in new
capital.
Wolman￿ s suggestion to investigate more re￿ned estimates of marginal
cost is recently attracting more attention. We believe that richer data of
29marginal cost proxies, particularly from data that also re￿ ect information
about key leading economic indicators, such as expectations about interest
rates, borrowing costs and investment, that are so far largely neglected in
empirical estimations of the NKPC, may substantially improve the existing
empirical evidence on forward looking behavior in price setting and in￿ ation.
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33Data De￿nitions
All the data, with the exception of commodity price index, are sourced from
the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis and
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The commodity price index is the
spot commodity index sourced from the Commodity Research Bureau
at: http://www.crbtrader.com/crbindex/
Labor Cost (nonfarm): Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Non-Labor Costs (nonfarm) = Non-Labor Payment (non farm) - Corporate
Pro￿ts (nonfarm)
Non-Labor Payments (nonfarm): Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
These payments include pro￿ts, consumption of ￿xed capital, taxes on
production and imports less subsidies, net interest and miscellaneous
payments, business current transfer payments, rental income of persons,
and the current surplus of government enterprises.
Corporate Pro￿ts (nonfarm):US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 6.16D
(sum of pro￿ts of all non-farm domestic industries)
In￿ation - Change in the log of the GDP de￿ ator.
Nominal (nonfarm) GDP: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.3.5
Output Gap: Log di⁄erence between real GDP and the Hodrick-Prescott
￿ltered trend.
Total Costs (nonfarm) = Labor Cost (nonfarm) + Non-Labor Costs (non-
farm)
Unit Labor Costs (nonfarm)= (log) Labor Cost (nonfarm) - (log) Nominal
(nonfarm) GDP
Total Unit Costs (nonfarm)= (log) Total Costs (nonfarm) - (log) Nominal
(nonfarm) GDP
343536373839Table 1: Break Point Tests in the Persistence of Marginal Cost












Note: This table presents results of tests for shifts in persistence using the Perron and Vo-
gelsang (1992) innovational outlier model over the period: 1966Q1 to 2003Q4. * indicates
signi￿cance at the 5% level.
40Table 2: NKPC Estimates: Unit Labor Cost vs Total Unit Costs







































































































Note: This table reports non-linear IV (GMM) estimates of the deep structural parame-
ters in equation (24), using labor unit cost and total unit costs as proxies to marginal
cost. The estimation uses quarterly data over the period: 1966:Q1-2003:Q4. The instru-
ment set includes four lags of the real marginal cost proxy, in￿ ation, wage in￿ ation and
commodity price in￿ ation. Standard errors are shown in brackets. A 12-lag Newey-West
estimate of the covariance matrix is used. The last column presents the Hansen￿ s J-test
for overidentifying restrictions.
41Table 3: NKPC Estimates: Non-nested Tests
￿b ￿f ￿ J-Test Godfrey














Note: This table reports the GMM estimates of the reduced-form of equation (24), using
quarterly data over the period 1966 Q1 to 2003 Q4. The instrument set includes four
lags of the measure of real marginal costs, detrended output, wage in￿ ation and in￿ ation.
Standard errors are given in parenthesis below. A 12-lag Newey-West estimate of the
covariance matrix is used. The last two columns give the Davidson ￿ McKinnon J-test and
Godfrey non-nested tests. Asterisks (*) denote signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Table 4: Comparative estimates of NKPC with GGSL (2005)
￿b ￿f ￿ P(j-stat)














Note: This table reports GMM estimates of equation (24), using quarterly data over the
period 1960 Q1 to 1997 Q4. As in Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005) the instrument
set includes two lags of the real marginal costs proxy, in￿ ation, detrended output, and
wage in￿ ation and four lags of in￿ ation. The upper panel reports the comparative results
from the baseline estimates in Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005). Standard errors are
given in parenthesis below. A 12-lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance matrix is
used. The last column presents the Hansen￿ s J-test for overidentifying restrictions.
42Table 5: NKPC, GMM Estimates - detrended unit cost
￿t = ￿b￿t￿1 + ￿fEt￿t+1 + ￿mct
￿b ￿f ￿ Prob(j-stat)














Note: This table reports the GMM estimates of equation (24), using the Hodrick-Prescott
￿ltered detrended measures of marginal cost. The estimation uses quarterly data over the
period 1966:Q1 to 2003:Q4. The instrument set includes four lags of the measure of real
marginal costs, in￿ ation, wage in￿ ation and commodity price in￿ ation. Standard errors
are given in parenthesis below. A 12-lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance matrix is
used. The last column presents the Hansen￿ s J-test for overidentifying restrictions.
43APPENDIX
(Not for Publishing)
Appendix A: Further empirical tests
Table 2a, gives the t-statistics for the di⁄erence in the estimated parameters in
Table 2 using the standard test for di⁄erence in means. The null hypothesis
is that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the estimates. The critical value
of the t-statistics at the 5 percent level with 302 degrees of freedom is 1.98
and as such we reject the null hypothesis in all cases for all coe¢ cients.
Therefore, we conclude that, even when the standard errors are taken into
account, the size of lambda is signi￿cantly di⁄erent (higher in absolute terms)
when total unit cost is used as the measure of marginal cost, irrespective of
the orthogonality condition and restriction on beta.
Table 2a: NKPC Estimates: t- test for statistical di⁄erence
!   ￿ ￿b ￿f ￿
Total unit costs vs Unit labor costs
Unrestricted
(eq. 26) ￿12:65￿ ￿36:31￿ 19:55￿ ￿2:92￿ 4:32￿ 71:25￿
(eq. 27) ￿4:98￿ ￿27:19￿ 19:27￿ 5:15￿ 24:00￿ 98:81￿
Restricted ￿
(eq. 26) ￿10:64￿ ￿30:17￿ n:a: ￿3:83￿ 2:42￿ 83:45￿
(eq. 27) 30:56￿ ￿23:24￿ n:a: 88:26￿ ￿26:41￿ 165:09￿
Note: This table reports the t-statistic for di⁄erences in coe¢ cients of the NKPC estimates
using total unit cost and unit labor cost. The test is a two-tailed test with the null
hypothesis, H0 : xTUC ￿ xULC = 0, against the alternative H0 : xTUC 6= xULC. The
test statistic is t = (xTUC ￿ xULC)=psp, where sp = 2(s2
TUC + s2
ULC)=v and the
degrees of freedom are v = 2n ￿ 2 = 302; s is the standard error of the coe¢ cient
estimate. Stars (*) denotes the signi￿cance at the 5% level.
44Test for the Non-Nested Model
We are interested in comparing two competing models:
Mx : ￿t = XtA + ut
Mz : ￿t = ZtB + et,
where ￿t is the in￿ ation rate, Xt = (￿t￿1;E￿t+1;total unit costs)
0and Zt =
(￿t￿1;E￿t+1;unit labor costs)
0; ut and et are random errors and A and B are
the matrix of coe¢ cients estimated using GMM (instrumental variables). De-
￿ne W as the matrix of instruments and Q(W) the projection W(W
0W)￿1W
0.
The null hypothesis is that Mi, i = x;z is the valid model against the alter-
native Mj, j = x;z (i 6= j). The augmented model is ￿t = (1 ￿ ’)XtA +
’ZtB + "t. The null hypothesis tested is ’ = 0. Yet, since ’ cannot be
separately estimated in this model we use the Davidson and MacKinnon￿ s
(1981) test.
For the Godfrey non-nested test for instrumental variables estimators, the
augmented model is,
￿t = XtA + ( e Xt e A)￿ + "t,
where e A is the IV estimate of A; e Xt is the matrix of OLS residuals of the
regression of b Xt on b Zt; where b Xt = Q(W) X is the ￿tted values of the OLS
regression of X on W and b Zt = Q(W) Z is the ￿tted values of the OLS
regression of Z on W. The test for the validity of Mx is therefore a standard
t-test that ￿ = 0, (for more details see Godfrey, 1983).
45Table 6, provides the empirical estimates for the high and volatile in￿ ation
period sample used in Zhang, Osborn and Kim (2008). In the text we only
report the key coe¢ cients as shown by (eq 27), for the unrestricted case.
Table 6: NKPC Estimates: Unit Labor Cost vs Total Unit Cost (1968Q1-1981Q4)
Note: This table reports non -linear IV estimates (GMM) of the deep structural parameters in equation (25),
using labor unit cost and total unit costs as proxies formarginal cost. The estimation uses quarterly data over
the  period:  196 8:Q1-1981:Q4.  The  instrument  set includes  four  lags  of  the  real  marginal  cost  proxy,
inflation, wage in flation and commodityprice inflation. Standard errors are shown in brackets. A 12 -lag
Newey-West estimate ofthe covariance matrix isused. The last column presents t he Hansen’ s J-test for
overidentifying restrictions.
w y b gb gf l Prob(j-stat)
Unit Labor Cost
Unrestricted
(eq. 26) 0.511 0.739 0.975 0.412 0.581 0.029 0.998
(0.036) (0.039) (0.018) (0.106) (0.110) (0.004)
(eq. 27) 0.391 0.899 0.613 0.339 0.478 0.024 0.998
(0.021) (0.031) (0.026) (0.016) (0.019) (0.001)
Restricted
(eq. 26) 0.518 0.734 1.0 0.414 0.586 0.027 0.999
(0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.060) (0.002)
(eq. 27) 0.304 0.691 1.0 0.306 0.694 0.066 0.999
(0.027) (0.024) (0.011) (0.023) (0.002)
Total Unit Cost
Unrestricted
(eq. 26) 0.372 0.722 0.984 0.342 0.651 0.046 0.998
(0.039) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.001)
(eq. 27) 0.325 0.828 0.747 0.299 0.570 0.041 0.998
(0.023) (0.036) (0.051) (0.015) (0.024) (0.002)
Restricted
(eq. 26) 0.379 0.718 1.0 0.345 0.655 0.045 0.999
(0.040) (0.019) (0.068) (0.080) (0.003)
(eq. 27) 0.295 0.699 1.0 0.297 0.703 0.064 0.999
(0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.001)
46Appendix B: Log-linearization of c mct
At the steady state, RD = 1 + iD; R = 1 + iCB; iCB = 1
￿ > 1; RL = 1 + iL;
iL = iCB + ￿; where ￿ > 0. We denote log-linearization from steady state
by a hat, i.e. b X:
























































































(1￿￿) (1 + ^ wt ￿ ￿^ at ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)^ yt + (1 ￿ ￿)^ nt)



























1 + b Sn;t
￿i
where, b Sk;t = ^ rt￿(1￿￿)(b yt￿^ kt)￿￿^ ut, and b Sn;t = ^ wt￿(1￿￿)(^ yt￿^ nt)￿￿b at
are the shares of capital unit costs and labor unit costs respectively and
Sk = rk
￿k(y=k)(1￿￿)and Sn = w
￿n(y=n)(1￿￿) are their respective steady states.
We de￿ne deviations in the gross loan rate as
\ 1 + iL
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1 + iL
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RL + iL^ {L



















Use mc = (1+iL￿￿iCB)
(1￿￿Y ) [SK + Sn],
c mct =
￿
RL + iL^ {L




















Expanding, using b xtb yt ￿ 0,
c mct =
RL + iL^ {L
t ￿ #iCB(1 +^ {CB
t )
(1 + iL ￿ #iCB)
+












(1+iL￿#iCB) = 1 +
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iL(1 + b yt)
where here we assume that yt is given proportionally to the natural rate of output
so that its steady state value is unity.
The process of ￿t
49log(￿t) = ￿z log(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿z)log(￿t￿1) + ￿z;t;
log(￿) +b ￿t = ￿z log(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿z)(log(￿) +b ￿t￿1) + ￿z;t
log(￿) = ￿z log(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿z)log(￿) = ￿ > 0
Here we assume that due the imperfections in the credit markets, the steady
state mark-up ￿ > 1, so that ￿ = log(￿) > 0. Subtract log(￿) from both
sides,
log(￿) +b ￿t ￿ log(￿) = log(￿) ￿ log(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿z)b ￿t￿1 + ￿z;t
b ￿t = (1 ￿ ￿z)b ￿t￿1 + ￿z;t
50